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The main political division in politics in Northern Ireland is between those supporting the union with Britain (unionists) and those aspiring for a united Ireland (nationalists). Currently the largest nationalist party is the republican Sinn Féin (SF), where the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is the largest unionist party. These parties have replaced the constitutionally nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) who dominated until this century, and were considered 'less extreme'. counter-motion of flying it on designated days 2 . Public administration in Northern Ireland is challenged to handle competing forces of change and resistance to reform in a context of compliance in public participation and procedural fairness (McEvoy & Morrison, 2002 ).
This already difficult task is also happening in the context of high levels of political and public distrust (Murphy, 2013) (Goldie, 2012) . In this environment, the vote to restrict the flying of the flag precipitated an immediate mass protest from unionists, loyalist groupings and individuals 3 . It also saw a resurgence of death threats to politicians, attacks on political party premises, the blocking of major roads, violence, street rioting, personal injury and criminal damage leading to the closure of some businesses and widespread negative international media coverage (MacDonald, 2013) . This was nearly fifteen years into a peace process, which has been paradoxically declared to be both at risk (by senior police and politicians) but also "for the most part stabilising" and well embedded -by well-respected social commentators (Nolan, 2013) . This article provides a hermeneutic analysis of findings from original and previously unpublished research into public administration in post-conflict Belfast over the past decade. In doing so, it follows the model used by Lejano and Leong (Lejano & Leong, 2012) , with reference to the findings of Herian et al (Herian, et al., 2012) and the work of Bovaird and Löffler (2003) (2009; 2007) (Bryan, et al., 2010) (Goldie & Ruddy, 2010) . Further analysis allows some preliminary findings and observations about the capacity of local public administration to manage seemingly intractable political and policy struggles between elected members and their followers, and the implications for the practice and theory of public administration in local government, and especially in administrations in conflict laden contexts.
The context of post-violence governance in Northern Ireland
The Northern Ireland conflict was politically resolved by the Belfast Agreement, enacted in a raft of equality and human rights legislation (McCrudden, 1999; McEvoy & Morison, 2002) and implemented through institutional change in public administration (Goldie, 2012) and radical reforms to policing and justice (Murphy, 2013) . The 1998 Northern Ireland Act (NIA) was legislatively pivotal in this. Formal politics was transformed from the first-past-the-post system of majority voting to the d'Hondt system of proportional power sharing inclusive of all major parties in both the regional Stormont Assembly and in local Councils. Equality legislation in the NIA required that public administration both refrain from discrimination (section 76), and comply with the statutory duty to promote equality and good relations (section 75).
Specifically section 75 (1) required designated public authorities to have "due regard to promoting equality of opportunity 4 . Section 75 (1) and Schedule 9 5 advanced beyond any other equality legislation (McCrudden, 1999) and amounted to "the fourth generation equality laws, based on a positive duty to promote equality, rather than simply to refrain from discriminating" (Fredman, 2002, p. 122) . Resistance to change has been integral to formal politics in post-conflict Belfast and discursive battles over equality are a leading example (Shirlow & McGovern, 1998) (Hayward & Mitchell, 2003) . Public perception that nationalist politicians 6 welcomed these changes to administration and policy-making provided grounds for arguing over the form and substance of equality 7 ; resulting in debates wherein the meanings became contested discourses. Hayward and Mitchell assert a split between unionist 8 and nationalist interpretations and re-presentations of both equality and the equality agenda, with conservative unionist and egalitarian nationalist discourses in direct opposition. Irish Republican discourse changed from that of 'the long war', through 'politicisation of the struggle' to 'peace-building' (Shirlow & McGovern, 1998) , facilitating new space for the equality agenda. At an internal, organisational level, institutional postviolence change processes have also been hugely significant in illustrating both resistance to change and the need for processes to be powerfully manoeuvred through complex, political organisational and cultural processes (Murphy, 2013) .
The NI peace process coincided with the emergence of public governance (Bovaird & and Löffler, 2003) making clear distinctions between public management or administration and governance. The former concentrates on managerial ('top-down') techniques and 'value for 5 Schedule 9 of the Act requires a designated body to "assess and consult on the likely impact of policies adopted or proposed to be adopted on the promotion of equality of opportunity", i.e. to carry out an equality impact assessment (EQIA) on new and existing policy (ECNI, 2003) . 6 So too did the Women's Coalition and the Alliance Party (APNI). For the purposes of this discussion, however, the contrast between the 'orange' and 'green' camps is deemed more significant by Hayward and Mitchell. 7 Hayward et al define the equality agenda as more than the positive equality duty of Section 75 (1), by including measures that address "the structural, cultural and political forms of inequality". 8 Hayward et al (2003) note the Progressive Unionist Party discourse differs. (Goldie, 2008) .
In public governance this procedural transparency, consultation and fairness to stakeholders, and the public, are crucial (Bouvaird & Löffler, 2007, p. 299 (Lejano & Leong, 2012, pp. 799-800) Our research includes analysis of textual material and interviews, transcribed and agreed with politicians, officials, practitioners, and advisors. This information was triangulated between contrasting interviews, and between interviews and records from minutes, press, and subsequent statements. This structures our analysis of party positions and quotations from key political actors about flags, and the policy of designated days.
The Union flag is a potent symbol in a place where symbolism is highly politically charged.
The history of the flying of both the Union flag and the Irish tricolour in Belfast is redolent with struggles over sovereignty and demonstrations against discrimination, gerrymandering and objective grievances arising from inequality in the operation of public administration in Northern Ireland (Bew, et al., 2002) . Hennessey regarded the conflict as "an ethnic conflict between two national communities" 10 and the peace process as requiring considerable
'sensitivity' about the use and abuse of symbols and emblems in the public space (Hennessey, 2000, p. 185) . The Belfast Agreement recognised the importance of symbolism and the potential for future disputes about symbols or symbolic actions.
The divisiveness of symbolism is expressed in displays of flags and emblems as 'celebration' (Jarman, 1997) . The Union flag has "acquired an ethnic, Protestant connotation that it may not carry in the rest of the UK" (Wilson, 2000, p. 2).
Flags function to communicate compelling, if sometimes ambivalent, messages. They are integral to sustaining sectarian violence, particularly at sectarian interfaces (Jarman, 2003) 10 Darby also describes the conflict in terms of 'ethnic politics' that are "conservative politics, fuelled by fear of conspiracy, compromise and betrayal" (Darby, 1997, p. 113) . They function differently to constitutional politics, using discourse and reaching compromise, so that elections are "less about casting you votes than voting your caste" (Darby, 1997, p. 58) . (Goldie & Ruddy, 2010) and "are associated with allegiance, loyalty, territory and authority" and "can be used to challenge another group, to assert dominance or to seek a confrontation" (Bryson & McCartney, 1994, p. 10 and 26) . Displays assert the dominance of a particular political allegiance -and often paramilitary presence -and threaten confrontation with those who differ (Shirlow, 2006) (Goldie & Ruddy, 2010) . Displays at public events convey exclusive possession rather than civic ownership. with implications for politics and the peace process (Shirlow, 2006, p. 227 ) (Bryson & McCartney, 1994) . It is precisely because this is understood, and needs no articulation, that disputes around flags, emblems and symbols remain violent and require the attention of public administration. (Hennessey, 2000, p. 213) For the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) this was simply Unionist stalling after decommissioning of IRA arms had apparently been settled.
Long after regulation for central government buildings flying flags remained hotly contested in local government (Bryan & Gillespie, 2005 (Herian, et al., 2012, p. 829 Despite the progress made, with power-sharing and generous political gestures in peacebuilding the vote to change flags policy spawned immediate, widespread and lasting violence.
Belfast City Council and the origins of the flags protest
Republicans had always complained that the ethos and symbolism of the City Hall was almost entirely British, and that flying the Union flag there every day was an equality issue. 15 Local councillors had met to address contentious issues and improving inter-communal relations since 1991. APNI accepted the legal advice (as reported in their EQIA: 6-7) that they would be best advised to abide by the rules for central government rather than the 365 days a year option.
Unionist claims, that legal technicalities distinguished local from central government, opposed the spirit of Section 75 and the Agreement. Indeed the legal advice to the Council was that a tribunal might find against them on grounds of fair employment and treatment, and would require an explanation that was "more convincing than citing custom and practice". Commission advice in 2003 said it was a discretionary matter for local government to decide 18 . "The Commission has however concluded that it is ultimately for the Council to determine" (EQIA: 8).
The need for the Unionist 'identity' to be "protected" was paramount for the DUP. The issue of flying Irish Tricolour flags in the City centre (during the St Patrick's Day celebration for example), was conflated into a more general socio-political problem (intertextuality):
"One of the issues within the Unionist community is how it affirms its identity. If you go into a maintained school you will see the ethos of that school in terms of its being a Roman
18 It has been noted that the June 2006 ECNI determination on Lisburn City Council altered this. The issue of flags and emblems on St Patrick's Day in the City was only the tip of an iceberg where the bulk under the water was the serious absence of "affirmation of identity", which was ignored, according to the DUP, for whom flags symbolise power relations and identity.
The SDLP was strongly in favour of removing all symbols of territory marking. The frustration expressed by this Councillor was felt by many others including Sinn Féin. City
Council had looked at the possibilities of regulating displays of flags and emblems over a two-year period, and understood that making changes on the streets had to be a negotiated process. Sinn Féin claimed Unionists resisted change because it would be very unpopular with their voters, so that progress was impeded. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Chief Constables) and calling into question operational decisions at every turn. The cost of political expenses. Some commentators believed that the DUP had been looking for an issue which would allow them to reduce the support for the Alliance Party among former unionist voters (Mealagh, 2013) . were reduced to talking of a "disconnect" from the larger unionist parties and a "loss of our culture", which was because their only demand was to reverse the democratic decision of Belfast City Councillors.
We have noted that "affirmation of identity" was essential for the DUP in 2005. However, by 2012, the hermeneutic analysis of the flags dispute shows this was expounded by spokespersons for the dispute and demonstrations. Although the plurivocity of the flag protesters articulated the meanings of protest as ranging from loss of 'rights' and threats to unionist 'culture' to the 'disconnect' from the democratically elected unionist parties, they had also adopted the one-time DUP outlook. In the seven years from 2005 the narrative of unionist-culture-under-threat had been modified in the DUP discourse -not least because they had become the largest party in the Stormont Assembly -only to be taken up by those protesting. Thus the struggle against the new policy that restricts flying the Union flag to 18 days in Belfast City Hall was integral to the intertextuality of loyalism as increasingly alienated from mainstream unionist politics and the dominant unionist party in power.
Hermeneutic analysis is a key plank of interpretive epistemology which "emphasizes the need to understand from the perspective of the social actor" (Bryman, 2004, p. 394 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 This has thrown down the gauntlet to public administration in Belfast for both local government and the police in managing public space and delivering services safely.
The challenge has arisen in spite of the existence of the key constituent of good governance, which is "process fairness [that can be taken] to be a key driver of satisfaction and decision acceptance among the public." (Herian, Hamm, Tomkins, & M., 2012, p. 829 ).
Herian et. al. "use the general term ''public participation'' to describe the governmental efforts to solicit public input through various means". They hypothesize that those less certain and less informed about government will be more likely to perceive participation and engagement as increasing fairness in government's decision making and service provision. The importance of perceived 'fairness' is that it gives legitimacy to decision making and will facilitate acceptance of decisions and directives from government.
In Belfast there was process fairness in the form of public policy consultation 23 , democratic voting for policy change and procedural transparency; that is good public governance (Bouvaird & Löffler, 2007) . However, this neither had a moderating role in the long-running dispute, nor did it increase the legitimacy of the decision among protesters and unionists.
Indeed the legitimacy of governance was also called into question by nationalists and republicans who felt aggrieved that the procedural fairness and democratic decision was so rigorously contested by unionists; who appeared by be free to flaunt the laws on civil disorder with impunity. 23 The consultation had a poor response rate, which weakened its value for some. Yet for respondents favouring the status quo, it seemed to undermine the legitimacy of their Council's decision. (Haider, 2012) within conflict ridden environments. There is a need to carefully manage public sector reform processes to reflect the iterative, complex and adaptive nature of such reform so as to avoid institutions that have the appearance of effectiveness but not the function (Rao, 2014 ) (Rihani, 2002 ). The Belfast case shows us that even in an environment where reform is illustrated and embedded, the role of informal organisational networks and politically aware public managers is vital to conflict management -even if it is not sufficient to result in conflict prevention and a reawakening of tension and violence (Esman, 1999 ) (Brinkerhoff, 2005) . This in itself underlines the concerns of Kaufman (Kaufman, 2006) around the enduring emotional and symbolic roots of ethnic conflict and the need for political processes to reward moderation and reconciliation as transitions unfold. Given that NI is so often used as a model of 'peacebuilding', conflict resolution with the outcome of devolved democracy, this is particularly concerning (Byrne, 2001) . Indeed, the Belfast case illustrates that our lens of analysis in relation to post-conflict environments must move beyond that of political actors and governance processes to a focus on the empirical reality of how such processes act in practice and the challenges and paradoxes that fill the lived reality of conflict prevention, management and resolution at a local government level. A number of authors have argued that such an (Pettigrew, 1990 ) (Buchanan & Denyer, 2013) exploration of 'extreme cases' also provides us with an opportunity to further our 
Conclusions
Although the protest rumbled on, mass street demonstrations, illegal road closures, rioting and violence subsided. The Council was prevailed upon to fund a publicity campaign and was asked for compensation, by the city centre traders' association. The PSNI suffered injury and some loss of confidence within both unionist and nationalist communities. This raises questions about the capacity of local public administration to manage the consequences of a seemingly intractable political and policy struggle between elected members and their followers on the streets.
It is ironic that, despite efforts to strengthen a sense of British-ness with the Olympics and Diamond Jubilee in England the Institute for Public Policy research found "British identity is waning in England" (Hennessy, 2013) ; where another report that same day quoted a Belfast unionist councillor, apparently fearful for his British-ness, "Sinn Féin is determined at all costs to remove anything British from our national culture and identity" (Murray, 2013) .
What appeared to be huge progress in Belfast local government with generous and mature political gestures in 2005 degenerated into obdurate political contestation in the chamber and civil unrest on the streets in 2012-13. The significance of such difficulties around what are essentially symbolic but enormously significant gestures, has implications for both representations of democracy generally and the reinforcement of democratic 'scaffolding' in societies emerging from conflict. In particular we can identify the persistence of symbolic struggles long after serious violence has ceased and the potent capacity for some issues to emerge suddenly and in extreme and intractable ways. The continuing experience of local 
